Sean Morris
Emergency Planning Officer,
Leeds City Council
Leeds Civic Hall
Tel 0113 247 4341
Introduction
This paper will give a brief overview of the following:
The role and organisation of emergency planning in England and Wales;
The types of plans that local authorities are responsible for providing;
How emergency planning at military sites differs from local authority planning arrangements;
The main threats and hazards to the military bases at Menwith Hill and Fylingdales;
Other considerations and further action that could be taken.
Background to Emergency Planning
Until April 2001, emergency planning was under the jurisdiction of the Home Office. ‘Emergency planning’ was governed under the auspices of the 1948 Civil Defence Act. The 1948 Act required local councils to draft emergency plans for protecting communities in the event of a nuclear attack. This led to a long-running dispute with a large number of local authorities (who went on to form Nuclear Free Local Authorities) who felt that such plans were unrealistic, due to the devastating nature of a nuclear attack.
With the end of the Cold War, the Home Office (in 1993) amended the Act to permit local authorities to develop ‘peacetime emergency plans’, including the production of major peacetime disaster plans for dealing with the major hazards affecting the civil population.
In February 2001, the Home Office initiated a thorough review of the nature and organisation of emergency planning in England and Wales. Shortly afterwards the government responsible department for emergency planning was transferred to the Cabinet Office by the Prime Minister following a spate of major incidents (fuel crisis, flooding, train crashes, foot and mouth disease) where it was felt the emergency response was found wanting.
A new legislative duty for emergency planning is likely to result from the review and will hopefully enhance the role and influence of emergency planning officers. However, the whole process may take between 3 and 5 years.
Emergency planning for military sites (which both Menwith Hill and Fylingdales come under) comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is understood that the MOD undertakes risk and hazard assessments and produces appropriate emergency plans. There is usually some limited discussion between military sites and local authorities where off-site plans exist, but often issues of ‘national security’ and ‘crown immunity’ ensure that MOD plans remain secret.
Both Menwith Hill and Fylingdales bases do have some discussion with the Health & Safety Executive and the Environment Agency about hazards on-site.
The role of local authority emergency planning
Local authorities are expected - through emergency planning units - to provide robust, agreed and exercised plans to ensure an effective response to a range of emergency incidents for the safety of the local community.
Local authorities are not an emergency service, but provide a wide range of services which may be called upon by other agencies as part of an emergency response. Examples of these include providing temporary accommodation, road closures, cleaning, feeding, and specialist services, such as Building Control and Environmental Health.
The main role of emergency planning units is to ensure a swift and co-ordinated response to a request from the emergency services, and the mobilisation of council resources at short notice.
Local authorities - in their role as community leaders (a key part of their likely future legislative duty) - play an important public information role during and after an emergency incident.
The responsibility for planning a response to a major terrorist, conventional military or nuclear attack remains with central government in the form of the Home Office, MOD, intelligence and security services. The role of local authorities is solely to prepare plans for the civil population.
Emergency planning at military sites
For the Menwith Hill and Fylingdales sites the overall responsibility for emergency plans on the bases lies with the RAF Base Commander. This could include plans for dealing with bomb threats, suspicious packages, actual attacks on the base and fire evacuation procedures.
It is likely that specific plans are in place at the Menwith Hill and Fylingdales bases to deal with radio hazards, the creation of an exclusion area around radomes (for the health and safety of operational staff), and to back-up computer files in case of fire or technical difficulties with the equipment within each radome.
All military bases with American personnel have been on a state of ‘amber alert’ since the terrorist attacks in the United States. ‘Amber alert’ means that all visitors to the base are stopped and searched, and additional armed MOD Police have been stationed by all entrances with sniffer dogs to check all vehicles. Security at Menwith Hill had already been increased after the embarrassing Greenpeace ‘invasion’ of the base shortly before the terrorist attacks.
There are usually no statutory off-site plans at military sites, unless chemical or nuclear materials are kept in the base. As a result bases have little contact with local authority emergency planning units. In contrast, Menwith Hill and Fylingdales bases have regular contact with the local authority planning and highways departments over planning applications and works around the base.
A direct request for any local authority assistance (in the case of a larger attack or incident on the base that could go beyond normal planning arrangements) is likely to come through the Police.
Threats and hazards to the Menwith Hill and Fylingdales bases
The most likely hazard to occur at either base are accidents on or near a base caused by human error. Both bases (particularly Menwith Hill) are quite complex locations. The amount of electrical equipment, potentially hazardous chemicals, and other industrial processes (it is difficult to say which due to the secrecy of the sites) could potentially create situations where major problems arise on the base necessitating evacuation or external help from the likes of a resource intensive local authority.
The likelihood of various other hazards and threats have clearly increased since the terrorist attacks of 11th September. A direct hit from a plane into a radome would have a devastating effect on the entire US intelligence service. Similarly, an attack from another type of vehicle such as a petrol tanker, is clearly now not outside the realm of possibility. The sheer scale of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington mean no potential American target can be seen as completely ‘low risk’.
A chemical, biological or conventional bomb attack on either base is also possible. Academic studies on terrorist groups have often stated that a small-scale attack (the bomb in the suitcase) is much more likely than the set-piece military attack. The history of IRA activity has emphasised how straightforward it has been for a well-organised cell network to launch an effective attack on what it considers are ‘legitimate’ targets.
A nuclear attack on either base (and from which the ‘Son of Star Wars’ system is designed to protect) remains unlikely. Recent intelligence reports cited by the media suggest terrorist groupings and ‘rogue states’ have been attempting to obtain nuclear materials for such weapons, but have so far been unsuccessful. However, it is quite possible for such groupings to obtain enriched or depleted uranium through crime cartels). Such ‘dirty’ bombs could spread a considerable amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere and have a devastating long-term effect on the environment. Research by the Nuclear Free Local Authorities suggests that a strike on a nuclear power station (such as BNFL Sellafield’s High Level Waste Tanks) could be much more devastating and would be a more obvious target for such an attack.
The French government has recently placed surface to air missiles around nuclear sites to protect them from a terrorist attack. UK nuclear and military sites have not gone as far as this, though ‘no flying zones’ have been created around them. If the UK government receives a credible threat (and publicly it says there is no such threat) to military and nuclear sites then such protection is likely to be put in place.
Emergency planning response to an attack/accident on the base
Both Menwith Hill and Fylingdales lie within the boundaries of North Yorkshire County Council. If a major attack or accident occurred at the base, then the Council’s emergency planning unit could invoke its Civil Emergency Scheme in order to mobilise specific resources.
North Yorkshire County Council does not have a specific emergency plan for dealing with different types of hazard surrounding the bases.
It is important to note that there are no major urban centres directly adjacent to either base which could accommodate large numbers of people requiring treatment or shelter. Menwith Hill is around 6 miles from Harrogate and 8 miles from Otley, while Fylingdales is about 8 miles from Whitby. Relevant councils in these areas may have to become involved to provide resources should the attack or accident be large scale, though it is likely that North Yorkshire County Council’s resources will be sufficient.
A terrorist attack of a nuclear, chemical or biological nature would also require a central government response. A national response plan and Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) is initiated by the Department of the Environment for radioactive hazards which involves local authorities providing public information under the REPPIR or Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001. Guidelines are also in place for dealing with CBW hazards which would again involve local authorities in a public information role. How such a role would be carried out with all the secrecy that surrounds both base is unclear.
Other considerations and action
The Menwith Hill Forum - an independent campaigning group seeking more transparency and accountability of the base - has been considering the commissioning of a full planning assumptions study. An academic expert would consider all the potential hazards relating to the base and relevant emergency plans needed to deal with them.
Both the Forum and the Fylingdales Action Network could contact the base to seek more clarity on the emergency planning arrangements within each base and how this may change with development of the National Missile Defence system. Similar contact with key agencies like the Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency may also allay fears over emergency planning concerns.
These groups and other organisations could publicise its concerns over how each base makes the wider area a target for attack. At public meetings held by the Menwith Hill Forum in Harrogate it is clear there is widespread public concern about this, reiterated by the local media.
Fundamentally, an increase in the transparency of both bases’ operations could assist greatly in emergency planning arrangements, regardless of how they develop. Much of what I have written is based on judgement of what is the norm with military bases. The secrecy that surrounds their operations prevents the public and professional officers feeling confident that they could assist in a response to an emergency incident at either base.
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